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Abstract
From theoretical linguistic and cognitive perspectives, situated dialog
systems are interesting as they provide ideal test-beds for investigating the
interaction between language and perception. At the same time there are a
growing number of practical applications, for example robotic systems and
driver-less cars, where spoken interfaces, capable of situated dialog, promise
many advantages. To date, however much of the work on situated dialog has
focused resolving anaphoric or exophoric references. This paper, by con-
trast, opens up the question of how perceptual memory and linguistic refer-
ences interact, and the challenges that this poses to computational models of
perceptually grounded dialog.
1 Introduction
Situated language is spoken from a particular point of view within a shared per-
ceptual context [6]. In an era where we are witnessing a proliferation of sensors
that enable computer systems to perceive the world, effective computational mod-
els of situated dialog have a growing number of practical applications, consider
applications in human-robot interaction in personal assistants, driver-less car inter-
faces that allow interaction with a passenger in language , and so on. From a more
fundamental science perspective, computational models of situated dialog provide
a test-bed for theories of cognition and language, in particular those dealing with
the binding/fusion of language and perception in the interactive setting involving
human conversational partners and ever-changing environment.
The history of computational models of situated dialog can be traced back to
systems in the 1970’s such as SHRDLU which enabled a user to control a robot arm
to move objects around a simple simulated blocks micro-world [66]. Since these
early beginnings there has been consistent research on computational models of
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the interface between language and vision1. A commonality across many of these
systems is that they have a primary focus on grounding (in the sense of Harnad
[25] rather than Clark [8]), the references within a single utterance against the
current perceptual context. For example, many of these systems are concerned with
grounding spatial references2. Some of these systems do maintain a model of the
evolving linguistic discourse. However, many of these systems assume a fixed view
of the world, and hence the question of how to store perceptions of entities that
have not yet been mentioned does not arise as the necessary perceptual information
relating to these entities is always present through direct perception of the situation.
Consequently, these systems have no perceptual memory, and so cannot handle
reference to entities that have been perceived but are no longer visible. Within
this context, this paper highlights the challenges posed to computational models
of situated dialog in designing models that are capable of resolving references to
previously perceived entities.
Paper structure: Section 2 frames the papers focus on reference, and highlights
the role that memory plays in reference within dialog; Section 3 overviews some
of the main cognitive theories and models of human memory; Section 4 expands
the focus to include models of reference in situated dialog, including models of
data fusion from multiple modalities; Section 5 compares two different approaches
to designing computational data structures of perceptual memory (one approach
is discrete/local/episodic in nature, the other is an evolving monolithic model of
context); Section 6 concludes the paper, where we argue that a blend of these
approaches is necessary to do justice to the richness and complexity of situated
dialog.
2 Reference in Dialog
Referring expression can take a variety of surface forms, including: definite de-
scriptions (“the red chair”, indefinites (“a chair”), pronouns (“it”), demonstratives
(“that”). The form of referring expression used by a speaker signals their belief
with respect to the status the referent occupies within the hearer’s set of beliefs.
For example, a pronominal reference signals that the intended referent has a high
degree of salience within the hearer’s current mental model of the discourse con-
text.
1Examples of such research spanning the decades include [58, 38, 45, 32, 20, 39, 48, 13, 64, 63,
34, 26, 15, 62, 52]
2Herskovits [27] provides an excellent overview of the challenges posed by spatial language.
Many computational models of spatial language are based on the spatial template concept proposed
by Logan and Sadler [54]; see [19, 40, 10, 37] for examples of spatial template based computational
models of the semantics of topological prepositions, and [18, 42, 5] for computational models of
projective prepositions. More recently models based on the concept of an attentional vector sum
[59, 41], and the functional geometric framework [12, 11] have been proposed. Another stream of
research on spatial language deals with the question of frame of reference modelling and ambiguity
[7, 35, 16, 14, 61]
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The term mutual knowledge describes set of things that are taken as shared
knowledge by interlocutors, and hence are available as referents within the dis-
course [57]. In a situated dialog, an interlocutor may consider an entity to be in
the mutual knowledge set if: (i) they consider it to be part of the cultural or bio-
graphical knowledge they share with their dialog partner, or (i)) it is in the shared
perception of the situation the dialog occurs within.
The term discourse context (DC) is often used in linguistically focused research
on dialog to describe the set of entities available for reference due to the fact that
they have previously been mentioned in the dialog:
“The DC has traditionally been thought of as a discourse history, and
most computational processes accumulate items into this set only us-
ing linguistic events as input” [6, pg. 3].
In this paper, we will often distinguish between the mutual knowledge set and
the discourse context, where the mutual knowledge set contains the set of entities
that are available for reference but which have not been mentioned previously in
the discourse, and the discourse context being a record of the entities that have been
mentioned previously. Given this distinction between mutual knowledge and the
discourse context, the process of resolving a referring expression can be character-
ized as follows: a referring expression in an utterance introduces a representation
into the semantics of that utterance and this representation must be bound to an
entity in the mutual knowledge set (in the case of evoking or exphoric references)
or in the discourse context (in the case of anaphoric references) for the utterance to
be resolved.
This process of resolving a referring expression against the mutual knowledge
set or the discourse context means that we can distinguish three types of referring
expressions based on the information source they draw their referent from (as op-
posed to their surface) form, namely: evoking, exophoric and anaphoric references.
An evoking reference refers to an entity that is known to the interpreter through
their conceptual knowledge but which has not previously been mentioned in the
dialog. Consequently, the referent of an evoking reference is found in the mutual
knowledge set, and the process of resolving this reference introduces a representa-
tion of the referent into the discourse context. An exophoric reference denotes an
entity that is known to the interpreter through their perception of the situation of
the dialog but which has not previously been mentioned in the dialog. Similar to
an evoking reference, the process of resolving an exophoric reference introduces a
representation of the referent into the discourse context. An anaphoric reference
refers to an entity that has already been introduced mentioned in the dialog and
hence a representation of its referent is already in the discourse context. Figure 1
illustrates the relationships between the data structures and categories of reference
described above.
All of these form of reference draw upon human memory. Mutual knowledge
and the maintenance of a discourse context are both ’stored’ in memory. Therefore
in order for a computational system to be able to resolve exophoric references in
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Figure 1: The relationship between mutual knowledge, the discourse context, and
evoking, exophoric, and anaphoric references.
must include, and maintain, data structures that represent the the memory compo-
nent that maintains the mutual knowledge element of shared perceptual experience.
To inform the design of this memory data structure in the next section we will re-
view cognitive theories of memory.
3 Cognitive Theories of Memory
Cognitive psychology3 distinguishes between a number of different types of mem-
ory including:
sensory memory which persists for several hundred milliseconds and is modal
specific
working memory which persists for up thirty seconds and has limited capacity
long-term memory which persists from thirty minutes to the end of an person’s
lifetime, and has potentially unlimited capacity.
Figure 2 illustrates the Atkinson & Shiffrin [3] model of how these different
types of memory interact . External inputs are initially stored in modality spe-
cific sensory memory buffers. There is an attentional filter between these sensory
specific memories and working memory. Information that is attended to passes
through to working memory, and unattended information is lost. Information in the
working memory that is frequently rehearsed is transferred to long-term memory
3See, for example [17].
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Figure 2: Atkinson and Shiffrin’s Multi-store Model of Memory
and may be retrieved later. Information is working memory that is not rehearsed is
displaced as new information arrives.
Evoking references draw on long-term memory and exophoric references draw
on working memory4. Furthermore, it is reasonable that the discourse context
model should be considered a part of working memory. These observations point
to a partial mapping between components of Figure 1 and Figure 2. Working mem-
ory is where the part of mutual knowledge that is based on perception of the sit-
uation and also the discourse context model are stored and maintained; whereas,
long-term memory is where the information used to resolve evoking references
is stored. The mapping indicates that working memory is at crux of handing ex-
ophoric references.
According to Baddeley [4] working memory has four major systems, see figure
3, these are:
centreal executive is modality independent and is responsible for supervising the
integration of information, directing attention, and coordinating the other
systems
phonological loop holds speech based information and can maintain this informa-
tion over short periods by continuous rehearsal
visual-spatial sketchpad stores visual and spatial information and can construct
visual images and mental maps
episodic buffer a limited capacity buffer that temporarily stores and integrates in-
formation from the phonological loop and the visuo-spatial sketchpad, and
can also link to long-term memory, and perhaps other modules dedicated
to smell, taste, and so on. The information sources that the episodic buffer
draws upon use different encoding schemes, however the episodic buffer
integrates these disparate encodings into a unitary representation of chrono-
logically ordered episodes.
4Exophoric references can also affect the attention filter between sensory memory and working
memory, see [15] for more discussion on this point.
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Figure 3: Baddeley’s Model of Working Memory
4 Grounding Language in Vision
Grosz [21] highlighted that attention processes can affect how references are re-
solved during a dialog. In particular, Grosz observed the interaction between the
shared focus of attention and the use of exophoric definite descriptions. Specifi-
cally, if an object is in the mutual focus of attention it can be denoted by means
of a definite description even though other entities fulfilling the description are
present in the mutual context set. Grosz & Sidner [23] extended this work and de-
veloped a focus stack model of global discourse attentional state. Other models of
global discourse structure and processing have since been proposed, for example
[28, 56, 44, 43, 2, 29]. However, whichever model of global discourse structure is
assumed the question of how the focus of attention and reference interact within
a local discourse context must also be addressed, and a number of approaches to
this question have been proposed, for example [1], [24], [51], and [22].5 However,
none of these models explicitly accommodate multimodal contexts.
Harnad [25] addresses the question of grounding language in perception. More
recently, Coradeschi and Saffiotti [9] has addressed this in terms of the symbol
anchoring framework, Roy [60] has proposed semantic schemas, and Kruijff et al.
[49] proposed an ontology-based mediation between content in different modal-
ities. Generally, these works focus on exophoric references but assume that the
referent is still perceptually available. An interesting, and understudied, category
of reference are exophoric references to entities that are not perceptually available
at the time of the reference. For example, consider an entity that was seen by two
interlocutors just prior to either of them referring to it, but which is no longer vis-
ible to either of them, perhaps because they (or it) has changed location. The fact
that the entity is no longer accessible through direct perception highlights the need
for a memory of perception to be maintained to handle these references, and we
will refer to these types of exophoric references as references to perceptual memo-
ries. These types of references are interesting for two reasons. First, in general, (as
noted above) to date exophoric reference have been studied under the assumption
that the referent is still perceptually available to the interlocutors. Second, enabling
a computational model to handle exophoric referents to entities that are no longer
5See [50] for a comparison of these approaches.
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perceptually available requires the design of a perceptual memory data structure.
This perceptual memory data structure stores the mutual knowledge information
related to the interlocutors shared perceptual experience of the situation (see Sec-
tion 2). Furthermore, this perceptual memory data can be understood as part of
working memory (see Section 3).
5 Perceptual memory
The design of a perceptual memory data-structure opens up a number of significant
research questions, for example: should all entities that are perceived be entered
into this data structure or is their a filtering process (e.g. an attentional filter); once
and entity enters the perceptual memory is it there indefinitely or can it be removed
(forgotten); how does the perceptual memory interact with the linguistic discourse
history (are they separate); how is the perceptual memory structured, for example,
is it episodic or monolithic, does it have a chronological order; and so on.
There are examples of computational models that can function as perceptual
memories in the literature. For example, in Robotics there is a long tradition of re-
search on the problem known as Simultaneous Localisation and Mapping (SLAM),
seminal work in this field includes [53], and [65] provides a more recent introduc-
tion and overview of this research. SLAM algorithms integrate sensor information
received over a period of time as a robot moves around an environment into a single
map representation. Once constructed this map enables a robot to navigate through
the environment without colliding with fixed obstacles, such as walls. However, at
least in the standard versions of SLAM these maps have no semantic information
about what this are, rather the focus is on mapping there are things. So, in some
ways, SLAM models can be understood as akin to the visuo-spatial scratchpad in
Baddeley’s model of working memory. Although undoubtably useful for robot nav-
igation, SLAM models, and the encodings they use, are not designed to facilitate
linguistic reference. For this, we need a model that integrates both visuo-spatial
information and linguistic information, something akin to the episodic buffer in
Baddeley’s model.
5.1 A Local/Episodic Architecture
The LIVE system [36], is a candidate architecture for this episodic buffer module.
The LIVE system is designed as a natural language interface to a virtual town,
similar in spirit to Winograd’s SHRDLU system discussed earlier. A distinctive
characteristic of the LIVE system, is that the user was able to move around the
environment, and the system had a perceptual memory module that enabled the
user to refer to off-screen objects that had been seen recently. The LIVE system
uses a false colouring visual salience algorithm to process each frame (visual scene)
generated as the user moved through the virtual environment [31, 30], there are
28 such frames generated per second. This visual salience algorithm identifies
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each object instance visible in a frame, and associates a normalised visual salience
score to each object, based on its size and location within the frame. For each
object in a scene the system also retrieves the object type (e.g. house, tree, etc.)
and colour information from the scene graph. Consequently, for each frame a list
of the visible objects along with their type and colour information and a salience
score is created. This frame information is then used to populate a data structure,
known as a reference domain. There is a separate reference domain created for
each frame. In a sense a reference domain can be understood as a representation of
the perceptual information in a frame that is designed to facilitate the grounding of
exophoric references.
A reference domain is composed of a number of lists, known as partitions,
and the elements of each partition is ordered, in descending order, by their visual
salience. The function of these partitions is to predict the different ways a user
may refer to an object in the scene. Every reference domain contained a general
object partition which listed all the objects in the scene ordered by their salience,
there was also a partition for each object type in the scene (e.g., if there are trees
visible in a frame then the corresponding reference domain would include a tree
partition listing all the trees visible ordered by their salience), and for each object
colour (e.g., if there are red objects in the scene then there would be a red partition
listing all the red objects ordered by colour). The set of potential partitions that
could be included in a reference domain is huge, for example there could be a
partition for red houses, or green trees, and other combinations of features. In
the design of the LIVE system the decision was taken to limit the initial set of
partitions to categories that are reasonably likely to be preattentively available,
namely, object, type, and colour. Partitions modelling more complex criteria may
be created within a reference domain in response to a linguistic utterances, the
reasoning being that the act of a referring expression specifying a set of selection
restrictions draws attention to the set of objects fulfilling the criteria and therefore
creating a partition to explicitly model this set is cognitively plausible at this point.
The feature structure below illustrates the reference domain for the frame shown in
Figure 4.
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Figure 4: A frame from the LIVE System. Note: the H1, H2, and H3 labels
were added to the image to help readers cross-reference with the reference domain
feature structure listed in the paper.

p1
criterion ‘object’
elements
[
H1,1.0; H3,0.2;H2,0.1
]
p2
criterion ‘house’
elements
[
H1,1.0; H3,0.2;H2,0.1
]
p3
criterion ‘red’
elements
[
H1,1.0
]
p4
criterion ‘blue’
elements
[
H3,0.2
]
p4
criterion ‘green’
elements
[
H2,0.1
]

The LIVE system stores these reference domains in a chronologically ordered
data structure with a capacity to hold 3,000 reference domains and using a first-in-
first-out policy; i.e., when the data structure was full the oldest reference domain
was deleted to make space for the new reference domain. This gives the system a
perceptual memory of 3,00028 = 108 seconds.
The LIVE system also maintained a discourse context model. This model is
similar in structure to the perceptual memory, it consists of up to 3,000 chronolog-
ically ordered reference domain data structures and uses a first-in-first-out policy
when the buffer is full. New reference domains are added to this discourse context
model as a result of resolving a referring expression. The LIVE system defines
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different algorithms for resolving referring different forms (i.e. surface forms) of
references (i.e, there are separate resolution algorithms for demonstratives, indef-
inite, definite, pronominal, one anaphora, and other anaphora references). The
high-level processing of all of these algorithms is: (i) select a reference domain
from either the perceptual memory or the discourse context that contain at least
one representation of entity whose features match the selection restrictions in the
reference (the selection process also considers the recency and internal structure
of the reference domain), (ii) make a copy of the selected reference domain, (ii)
restructure the reference domain (potentially by adding new partitions) to mark the
entity selected as the reference, and (iv) add the restructured reference domain to
the head of the discourse context list. The restructuring and augmentation of ref-
erence domains in response to a referring expression is dependent on the selection
restrictions specified in the reference and is designed to facilitate the processing of
potential subsequent anaphoric references.
In summary, the LIVE system maintains a separate perceptual memory and dis-
course context model, although both of these data structure have similar internal
structures (chronologically ordered lists of reference domains). The structure of
these components is somewhat similar to the episodic Buffer in Baddeley’s model:
limited capacity, chronologically ordered, and integrating visual perceptual infor-
mation with semantic information. Furthermore, the similarity in the encodings
in the perceptual memory and discourse context model facilitates reference reso-
lution, which entails copying, restructuring, and inserting of a reference domains.
Indeed, the approach to resolving a reference taken by the LIVE system can be un-
derstood as searching memory for a suitable episodic memory, using this episode
as local context within which the reference is resolving, and updating the episode to
mark the fact that the reference has occurred. Such a model is capable of handling
exophoric references to entities that were recently seen but are no longer on-screen.
However, using a reference domain representation of a frame/episode as defining
the (local) context for a reference makes it extremely difficult to handle references
to refer to two or more entities that never appeared in the same frame. Handling
these forms of references requires the system to be able to integrate multiple refer-
ence domains, and this is non-trivial; e.g., it is not clear how salience scores from
different frames, and hence different times, should be updated during this merger.
5.2 A Global/Monolithic Architecture
An approach to the design of a perceptual memory, that naturally answers the
question of how to integrate information from perceptions received across distinct
times, is to use an evolving global structure where all referents are stored in a single
data structure that is continuously updated to reflect the current state.
Koller et al. [46] describes an interface for playing textual computer games,
based on description logics and theorem proving. This model does not have a
visual component, instead the information relating to the physical environment of
the game world is provided via textual descriptions. However, the game world
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is never fully observable, and therfore a player’s knowledge of the game world
increases as they move through the game. The context model proposed in this
work is based on Description Logics, and uses a data structure known as the T-
Box to encode axioms related to concepts and roles (in a sense the ontology of
the world), and another data structure known as the A-Box to encode the entities
(instances of concepts) in the world. Interestingly, the system maintains two A-
Box data structures: (i) the game A-Box representing the full current game world
state, and (ii) the player’s A-Box representing what the player knows about the
game world (this A-Box is typically a sub-part of the world A-Box). As the player
moves through the game environment and explores new locations new instances
are added to the player’s A-Box. As a result, the player’s A-Box represents a
perceptual memory of what they have experienced in the world. Entities in the
player’s A-Box are marked with the property of here when they share the same
location as the player (i.e., the player and the entity are both in the same room
in the world), visible if the entity is deemed to be currently visible to the player,
and accessible if the player can currently manipulate the entity. Consequently, the
system has the ability to distinguish between entities that are currently visible and
entities that are known about but which are not visible. However, the design of
the reference resolution algorithms used by the system presupposes that: players
will typically only refer to objects which they can “see” in the virtual environment,
as modelled by the concept ‘visible’ [46, page. 12]. This assumption allows the
resolution algorithm to ignore entities in the world which are known to the player
(and, hence are in the player’s A-Box) but which are not currently visible when
resolving a referring expression. This assumption means that the system cannot
handle exophoric references to recently seen entities that are no longer visible,
as they are deliberately excluded from the context used to resolve references. It
should be noted that this is not a simple assumption to remove from the system.
The system has no model of perceptual salience (although it does have a model of
linguistic salience). As a result it must use this strict visible/invisible criterion to
exclude potential distractor entities (that are in the model of the player’s knowledge
of the world but which are not currently in the perceptual focus), which if not
excluded would make a reference appear unspecified and ambiguous to the system.
Kelleher [33] is another natural language interface to a virtual world. It is sim-
ilar to [36] in that it uses the same visual salience algorithm to analysis the visual
frames the user sees as they navigate through the environment. However, the data
structure used to store perceptual memories and discourse structure is very dif-
ferent. This system maintains a single global context model throughout a user’s
session. Once an entity has been rendered on screen a representation of that entity
is introduced in this global context model. There is only ever a single represen-
tation of an entity in the global context model. This representation of an entity
stores the physical information of the entity (e.g., type, colour, size, and so on)
and also stores a visual salience and a linguistic salience score for the entity. The
visual salience score is updated after each frame is processed. The visual salience
of an entity that is not in the current frame is halved when the frame is processed.
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As a result the visual salience of an entity drops off once it goes out of (visual)
focus (i.e., off-screen), and continues to reduce the longer out of focus it remains.
The linguistic salience scoring is based on the assumption that entities that have
been mentioned recently are more salient than entities that have not. The partic-
ular function used to calculate and update the linguistic salience scores is in the
spirit of Centering Theory [22] and is similar to the model proposed by [47]. The
linguistic salience of an entity is updated after each utterance has been processed.
The linguistic salience of any entity not mentioned in an utterance is halved when
the utterance is processed. Consequently, similar to the visual salience of an en-
tity, the linguistic salience of an entity drops once it leaves the (linguistic) focus,
and continues to drop the longer out of focus it remains. As the above description
indicates the representation of an entity in the global context model is a relatively
complex feature structure. However, the structure of the global context model itself
is minimal, it is simply an unordered set of these entity representations. The fact
that the linguistic and visual salience scores are updated based on recency of being
visible or mention means that the context model does not need to explicitly model
recency.
Reference resolution in this system is done by calculating an integrated salience
score for each entity in the context model, and then selecting the entity with the
highest integrated score as the referent. The integrated salience score of an entity is
recalculated each time a referring expression is processed. The integrated salience
score is calculated in three steps: (i) a reference relative visual salience score is
calculated by scaling the standard visual salience score to reflect the fit of the entity
with the selection restrictions specified in the expression (e.g., in the simplest case
the reference relative visual salience score is set to zero if the entity is of the wrong
type to be the referent of the reference); (ii) a reference relative linguistic salience
score is calculated in a similar way to the reference relative visual salience score;
and (iii) the integrated salience score is then calculated using a weighted sum of
the reference relative visual and linguistic salience scores, where the weighting is
dependent on the surface form of the referring expression (e.g., for pronominal
references the system weights linguistic salience more then visual salience).
The fact that this monolithic global context model does not encode an episodic
(frame based) structure means that the integration of information from different
scenes is straight forward. As a result, this system can handle references to entities
that do not appear on screen together. However, this flexibility is at a cost. The loss
of the episodic chronological order means that a system using this context model
would not be able to handle exophoric references based on chronology (such as the
first blue house we saw), or co-occurrence within a local temporal context (such as
the car that was in front of the house when the man fell).
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6 Discussion
The two approaches to perceptual memory described in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 can
be understood as exemplars at opposing ends of a spectrum of design choices: one
focuses on identifying a local context and resolving the reference within that con-
text, and the other focuses on creating and continuously evolving a global context
model. These approaches have complementary strengths and weaknesses. Conse-
quently, it is likely that a blend of these approaches is necessary. This is not sur-
prising as there are many examples in language processing6 where there is a need
to be able to switch from a local focus to a global perspective, and back again, as
the context requires.
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